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been associated with a rapid increase in the share of China in world trade. As the world is taking 
the full measure of this phenomenon, tensions have been arising ranging from holding China 
partly responsible for global imbalances to complaints about the “excessive” competitiveness of 
Chinese products. Without a quantifiable benchmark, however, such claims are difficult to judge. 
This paper therefore provides an assessment of China’s “natural” place in the world economy 
based on a new set of trade integration indicators. These indicators are used as a benchmark in 
such as economic size, location and other relevant factors. They constitute a better measure of 
trade integration that incorporates many more factors than traditional openness ratios. Results 
show that the model tracks international trade well and confirm that China is already well 
integrated in world markets, particularly with North America, several Latin American and East 
Asian emerging markets and most euro area countries. 
 
 
JEL: C23, F15, F14.  
 
Keywords: Gravity Model, Panel Data, Trade, China. 
 
The rapid transition of China from a closed agricultural society to an industrial powerhouse has 
order to examine whether China’s share in international trade is consistent with fundamentals 
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Non-technical summary 
China’s reform process towards a market-based economy has triggered a significant reorientation 
of international trade flows. China has indeed experienced very quick trade integration into world 
markets as exemplified by a strong increase in its share in world trade. As the world is taking the 
full measure of this phenomenon, tensions have emerged in the political and economic sphere. In 
particular, the emergence of China was perceived to affect the competitiveness and the 
employment situation in mature economies. Without a quantifiable benchmark, such claims are 
difficult to judge; however, to our knowledge, such quantification has never been attempted. 
The aim of the present paper is to fill in this gap and to contribute to the policy debate by 
providing an empirical assessment of China’s “natural” place in the world economy. Building on 
a companion study (see Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz (2005)), we use a gravity model to shed 
light on the overall degree of trade intensity of a large number of countries as well as the depth of 
bilateral trade linkages of China with major economies. Our gravity model employs a very large 
dataset of bilateral trade flows including more than sixty trading partners over more than twenty 
years. In the standard regression this amounts to more than 3,500 bilateral trade relationships and 
almost 53,000 observations. The model is estimated in a two-step panel data framework – as 
advocated by Cheng and Wall (2005) – which takes country heterogeneity properly into account. 
The estimates are plausible and robust to different estimators and samples. Moreover, they are 
able to capture most of the variation in bilateral trade flows, both across countries and over time. 
The new measure of multilateral trade integration is based on the part of the fixed effects which 
are orthogonal to available time-invariant variables in the second step regression. It constitutes a 
better measure of trade integration than standard variables such as the share in world trade or the 
ratio of exports and imports to GDP, because it incorporates many more factors. Accordingly, it 
is more appropriate as a benchmark for examining whether China’s share in international trade is 
consistent with economic fundamentals. 
The paper suggests that the rise in trade flows between China and its trading partners should not, 
per se, come as a surprise. China's shift towards more market-oriented policies together with 
robust economic growth was instrumental for the reorientation and deepening of trade linkages. 
At the same time, we find that China – given its size and location – is already well integrated into 
the world economy, which contrasts with the experience of other transition countries with a 
planned-economy history in Central and Eastern Europe. In more detail, the new indicators of 
trade intensity suggest that China displays a higher degree of global trade integration than many 
other industrialised countries or Asian trading partners. However, our measure of trade 
integration for China is not higher than that of several developed countries such as the US, 
Germany or Japan. Our bilateral measure of trade integration suggests that China seems to be 
particularly well integrated with the United States and Canada, several Latin American and East 
Asian countries as well as most euro area countries. 
5
ECB
Working Paper Series No 693
November 2006 
1. Introduction 
Famously, Napoleon is said to have remarked that “China is a sickly, sleeping giant. But when 
she awakes the world will tremble”. Nearly two centuries later, China is truly awake and it seems 
that the world is now taking the full measure of this phenomenon: the brisk pace of China’s 
integration into the world economy strikingly affected global trade, while it is also perceived to 
have triggered tensions in the political and economic sphere. These tensions range from holding 
China partly responsible for global imbalances to complaints about the “excessive” 
competitiveness of Chinese products adversely affecting the employment situation in partner 
countries. 
Without a quantifiable benchmark, however, such claims appear very difficult to assess. 
Historically, the rise of China may essentially constitute a return of the country to where it once 
was before it fell asleep. For several hundred years, China was a rich empire and highly advanced 
in terms of technology, albeit relatively closed to the rest of the world – as symbolised by the 
Great Wall of China encircling almost 4,000 miles of their land.
2 This relative isolation lasted 
until the early 19
th century, when China still accounted for about one third of world output. 
Thereafter, the country experienced a long period of economic stagnation and even decline in the 
1950s and 1960s. Following the rapid transition of China from an impoverished and closed 
agricultural society to a globally integrated industrial powerhouse, the penetration of world trade 
by Chinese products could be rationalised at least partly by the quickly growing size of its 
economy and by its opening up towards the world economy which culminated in its WTO 
accession in 2001.
3 Unless China were to develop as an autarky, which no one would seriously 
consider, one can expect that China is going to take up some share of world trade. The question 
then is: how much? 
This raises the question of the “natural” place of China in the world economy and calls for a 
quantification of China’s share in international trade, given its economic size, location and other 
relevant fundamentals. However, to our knowledge, such exercise has never been attempted. The 
aim of the present paper is to fill in this gap by using results from a gravity model to derive a 
measure of multilateral trade integration (China against all trading partners) but also of bilateral 
trade integration (between China and each of its trading partners). Gravity models previously 
applied to China had a different focus as they commonly aimed at quantifying the impact of 
policy variables, whereas our aim is to develop a new set of trade integration indicators which are 
used as a benchmark to examine whether the China’s external trade is consistent with the 
economic fundamentals included in a gravity equation. For instance, Abraham and Van Hove 
                                                 
2   China has been at times very open to the world, like in the early 15
th century under Emperor Yung Ho, who 
considerably developed the naval and merchant fleet and opened new trade routes going as far as the Eastern 
coast of Africa; see Boorstin (1983) for a historical perspective. 
3   See Branstetter and Lardy (2006) for a very detailed and comprehensive overview of the major steps in the 
evolution of Chinese policy towards international economic integration. 
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(2005) use a gravity model mainly for Asian countries in the 1990s to investigate the impact of 
regional free trade arrangements on China’s trade. Likewise, Lee and Park (2005) use the large 
panel of Glick and Rose (2003) – more than 200,000 country pairs – to study the trade diverting 
and trade creating effects of free trade arrangements. Using a smaller panel, Bénassy-Quéré and 
Lahrèche-Révil (2003) examine the impact of a yuan revaluation. Meanwhile, Eichengreen, Rhee 
and Tong (2004) investigate the effect of China’s rapid trade integration for other Asian 
economies given their structure of external trade. They find that Chinese exports tend to crowd 
out exports from other Asian economies, especially for consumer goods. Filippini, Molini and 
Pozzoli (2005) decompose trade into three categories of technological content and test whether a 
measure of “technological distance” helps explaining bilateral trade flows. Closer to our 
approach, Batra (2004) estimates a gravity model with a focus on India using a cross-section 
equation and finds that India has significant scope for strengthening trade with China and the rest 
of Asia.
4  
Our approach differs from the existing literature as we use the results of a gravity model as a 
benchmark for China’s trade integration instead of testing for a particular theory or evaluating the 
impact of a given policy variable. Building on a companion study (see Bussière, Fidrmuc and 
Schnatz (2005), our gravity model is based on a very large dataset of bilateral trade flows 
including more than sixty trading partners over more than twenty years, which is able to capture 
most of the variation in bilateral trade flows, both across countries and over time. We consider 
only trade in goods since a breakdown of trade in services by partner country is not available for 
all countries in the sample. The model is estimated in a two-step panel data framework – as 
advocated by Cheng and Wall (2005) – which takes country heterogeneity properly into account. 
The chosen empirical method allows constructing an indicator which is used as a benchmark for 
comparing trade intensity across countries. These indicators should, however, not be given a 
normative interpretation, as they may depend on a variety of factors such as political 
configurations or the commodity composition of trade flows between a particular pair of 
countries. 
The information provided by these indicators suggests that (i) China is already very well 
integrated in world markets and (ii) that the strong rise of Chinese trade flows with major 
industrial countries in the 1990s and early 2000s is well explained by the gravity fundamentals.
5 
Both results are noticeable as they contrast with the experience of other transition countries with 
a planned-economy history in Central and Eastern Europe, as analysed in Bussière, Fidrmuc and 
Schnatz (2005). Indeed, these countries were found to have experienced a long period during 
which their trade flows were below the gravity benchmark, after the beginning of the transition 
process. Accordingly, we also found that actual trade grew more strongly than projected trade for 
                                                 
4   This review does not include the studies that took a completely different approach to China’s trade integration 
and have used general equilibrium models instead; see McKibbin and Woo (2002), Yang (2003), or Prasad 
(2004) for a review. 
5   It seems however that the model underpredicts the acceleration of China’s trade flows after 2003. 
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these countries, which we mainly interpreted as a convergence towards their trade potential. We 
offer several possible interpretations of this difference in Section 4; they relate to the role of 
process trade, foreign investment, the Chinese diaspora, as well as the role of the war for some 
South Eastern European countries. Meanwhile, the indicators of trade intensity suggest that China 
displays a higher degree of global trade integration than many other industrialised countries or 
Asian trading partners. However, our measure of trade integration for China is not higher than 
that of several developed countries such as Germany, the US, or Japan. 
Turning to our bilateral measure of trade integration (i.e., using the overall trade integration of 
each partner countries as a benchmark), China appears to be well integrated with Canada, 
Australia, the United States and several Latin American and East Asian emerging markets. 
However, if compared with the trade intensity of these countries with other Asian economies, 
trade intensity between China and the United States or Australia does not seem to be exceptional. 
On the other side of the spectrum, many Central and Eastern European countries have less intense 
trade links with China. Moreover, China’s trade intensity with India is found to be very low, 
which could be reconciled with historical developments. Among euro area countries, Germany, 
France and Spain seem to be well integrated with China already.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 shows some of the key stylised facts that 
motivated the choice of our specification; section 3 presents the gravity equation and the 
regression results, section 4 reports the results for selected country-pair examples and focuses on 
the information extracted from the second stage regression (the trade integration indicators). The 
last section concludes. 
 
2.  Bilateral trade flows: stylised facts 
In order to better grasp the nature of China’s integration in world markets, Table 1 presents five 
indicators of trade integration for China and other selected economies in 1995 and 2005 (more 
detailed information on the trade shares of selected economies going back to the 1980s can be 
found in the Chart Appendix). Four key insights can be derived from Table 1. 
First, over the past ten years, the share of China in world trade has more than doubled, from 3.7% 
to 7.7%, which is by far the largest increase recorded in the table.
6 Accordingly, China has 
become the third largest trading partner in the world, behind the euro area and the US.
7 This 
reflects both the buoyant economic growth recorded in China over this period and the rising 
                                                 
6   China did not only record by far the largest increase in absolute terms. What is even more noticeable is that it 
also recorded the largest increased in relative terms (by 108%), second only to Bosnia (see Table 3 in the 
appendix), whose share rose by nearly 300% mainly reflecting its very small share in 1995. 
7   For a meaningful comparison across countries, Table 1 reports the share of extra-euro area trade. The share of 
total (intra- plus extra-) euro area trade would be much higher as it includes trade across euro area countries 
(representing a little bit more than half of total trade). Detailed account and analysis of euro area trade can be 
found in Anderton, di Mauro and Moneta (2004). 
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integration of China into the global economy. As to the first factor, China’s share in world GDP 
rose from 9.5% to 15.4% between 1995 and 2005 (at purchasing power parity levels).
8 As to the 
second factor, China’s openness ratio – measured as the sum of imports and exports to GDP – 
doubled from around 33% to over 62% between 1995 and 2005 (see Table 1, col (f) and (g)). 
China is therefore, according to this measure, almost as open as Germany (64%) and more open 
than the United Kingdom (40%) or the United States (20%). The increase in China’s trade ratio 
was not linear: it remained broadly constant at around 32% between 1995 and 1999. 
Subsequently, it rose to about 38% in 2000 and 2001 to reach nearly 42% in 2002. Thereafter, it 
experienced a first jump to above 50% in 2003 and to more than 58% in 2004. To anticipate on 
the results, our model is able to account for the strong rise until 2002 but underpredicts the strong 
acceleration that took place in 2003. 
A second striking feature of China’s integration into world markets is that the composition of 
China’s trade flows by trading partners has remained broadly stable over this period. China’s 
external trade is concentrated among four main regions: Emerging Asia, the euro area, the United 
States and Japan (see Table 1, col. (b) and (c)). Mainly reflecting their geographical proximity, 
the other emerging Asian countries constitute the most important trading partner of China, 
accounting for 26.5% of Chinese trade. Among these countries, Hong Kong and South Korea are 
the most important trading partners, followed by Singapore and Malaysia.
9 The close trade ties 
with the latter two countries might also be partly attributable to the share of the population of 
Chinese origin in these countries. Beyond emerging Asia, the United States is the single most 
important trading partner followed by Japan and the euro area. Each of these countries/regions 
accounts for 12% to 15% of China’s trade. While the share of most major countries and regions 
was broadly stable in 2005 compared to 1995, the share of Japanese goods in Chinese trade has 
declined significantly.
10 Among the euro area countries, Germany is the most important trading 
partner of China, mainly reflecting the economic size of Germany as compared to other countries 
in the region.  
                                                 
8   This measure uses GDP evaluated in PPP terms, i.e. converting the GDP of all countries using Purchasing Power 
Parity exchange rates. In nominal (US dollar) terms, China’s share also doubled but at a lower level from 2.5% to 
5% of world GDP over this period, as the yuan’s current exchange rate is generally found to be lower than its 
PPP exchange rate, which partly reflects China’s stage of economic development and the corresponding lower 
prices of non-traded goods in China. This may be further compounded if, as widely perceived, the Chinese 
currency is undervalued. Although this finding is often reported in the literature, the magnitude of the 
undervaluation varies considerably across studies, see for instance Chang and Shao (2004), Coudert and 
Couharde (2005) or Frankel (2005). 
9   Bilateral trade data between China and Hong Kong partly reflect transit trade, see for instance Schindler and 
Beckett (2005) for a discussion. 
10   As shown in the chart Appendix, the share of Japan has actually decreased for many countries in the world. 
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Table 1: Key stylised facts on China’s external trade and comparison with selected 
economies, 1995-2005  
  
  Share of country in 
(a) in Chinese trade 
Share of China in 
trade of country in 
(a) 
Openness of 
country in (a) 
(Trade/GDP) 
Share of country in 




  1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 2005 
(a) (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)  (i)  (j) 
Emerging East 
Asian Countries  28.8 26.5 15.7 27.1 78.1 100.4  10.4  9.0  2.9 
Hong Kong  15.9  9.6  34.8  45.0 254.1 330.1  2.2  1.8  5.3 
Indonesia  1.2 1.2 3.8  10.3 40.4 54.5  0.8  0.8  1.6 
Malaysia  1.2 2.2 2.4  10.4 161.3 190.5  1.6  1.4  1.6 
Philippines  0.5 1.2 1.9  14.3 58.0 87.7  0.5  0.5  2.3 
Singapore  2.5 2.3 2.8  10.1 303.4 365.6  2.0  1.8  1.3 
South  Korea  6.0 7.9 6.2  19.5 49.2 68.7  2.3  2.6  3.1 
Thailand  1.2 1.5 2.8 8.9 98.4  129.1  1.2  1.1  1.4             
USA 14.5  14.9  4.4  11.4  17.9 20.6 13.6 12.1  1.2             
Japan 20.4  13.0  7.4  17.0  13.8 22.8  7.6  5.3  2.4             
Euro Area  12.0  12.1  3.0  6.6 21.7 29.7 18.0 17.0  0.7 
Belgium  0.8 0.8 0.7 2.1 112.0 136.5  2.8  2.7  0.3 
France  1.6 1.5 1.4 2.7 33.7 43.7  5.3  4.5  0.3 
Germany  4.9 4.4 1.9 4.3 39.3 63.9  9.2  8.2  0.5 
Italy  1.8 1.3 1.5 3.1  39.1 41.8  3.9  3.5  0.4 
Netherlands  1.4 2.0 0.9 4.6 88.5  102.2  3.5  3.4  0.6 
Spain  0.7 0.7 1.6 3.0  34.3 41.9  1.9  2.2  0.3             
Latin  America 1.7 3.0 1.6 5.6 17.9 29.1  3.5  3.9  0.7 
Brazil  0.7 1.0 2.3 7.0  13.7 24.2  1.0  1.0  1.1 
Mexico  0.1 0.5 0.4 1.9 34.8 37.1  1.4  1.9  0.3             
Russia  1.9 2.0 3.4 6.0  46.3 48.3  1.3  1.8  1.1 
           
Australia  1.5 1.9 4.7  12.7 29.8 32.0  1.1  1.1  1.8             
UK  1.7 1.7 0.9 3.4  44.4 40.2  4.8  4.1  0.4             
Canada  1.5 1.3 1.6 4.6 61.1 61.4  3.5  3.2  0.4             
India  0.4 1.3 1.7 7.8  20.5 31.5  0.7  1.0  1.3             
New EU Member 
States  0.5 0.8 0.8 2.8  50.7 79.6  1.5  2.6  0.2 
           
China       32.7  62.4  3.7  7.7              
Sources: IMF DOTS, WEO, IFS. 
Notes: The list includes countries with a share of more than 0.5% in China’s external trade in 2005. Table 3 (in the 
Table Appendix) provides a more complete overview encompassing more countries and indicators. The trade 
concentration index is based on Frankel (1997) and is measured as the share of country i in China’s trade to the 
share of country i in world trade (column (c) divided by column (i)). For the regional aggregates (e. g. euro area), 
the numbers refer to extra-regional trade (i.e., excluding trade across the countries included in the aggregate). 
 
A third observation from Table 1, taking this time the perspective of China’s trading partners, is 
that China’s importance as a trading partner has increased for all countries and regions between 
1995 and 2005 (see col. (d) and (e)). However, China’s trade integration has not affected these 
countries to the same extent: the increase in China’s trade share is particularly sizeable in most 
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other emerging Asian economies, Japan, Australia and the United States, while it is still more 
moderate in other regions.  
Notwithstanding the comparatively modest weight of China in euro area trade, it is noticeable 
that the share of China in extra-euro area trade has doubled over the past ten years. This increase 
has actually accelerated since 1999, whereas the shares of the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Japan in extra-euro area trade have declined (see Chart A1 in the Chart Appendix). While 
Japan experienced a protracted decline in its trade with the euro area, the share of the other Asian 
emerging countries in extra-euro area trade has remained broadly stable over the past five years, 
after falling sharply around the time of the Asian crisis. Taken together, Asian countries – i.e. 
Japan, China and other emerging Asian countries – are a larger trading partner of the euro area 
than the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Fourth, the rise in the market share of China is, by definition, associated with a loss in market 
share of other countries (see Table 1, col. (h) and (i)). Correspondingly, all major industrialised 
countries recorded some loss in world market shares, which was further intensified by the 
ongoing integration of other countries and regions into the world economy such as the new EU 
Member States, Russia and India. For Japan, however, the loss in market share seems to be 
particularly pronounced, which may partly reflect the prolonged period of stagnation experienced 
since the early 1990s, as well as the relocation of production by Japanese multinational firms to 
other Asian countries. Overall, taking the Asian countries (i.e. China, Japan and other emerging 
Asian countries) as a block suggests that its share of trade with most developed countries (and for 
the world as a whole) has remained broadly stable over the past ten years, which implies that the 
rise of market shares recorded by China has been partly offset by a fall in the market shares of 
other emerging Asian countries and especially by Japan.  
The stylised facts presented above therefore suggest that two factors – economic size and 
distance – have a strong influence on trade patterns, in line with the standard trade gravity model. 
The close – albeit less than proportional – relationship between trade and size is illustrated in 
Chart 1a, which relates the share of each country in world trade to its economic size (measured as 
GDP at constant 2000 USD). Its location in the chart above the regression line suggests that 
China’s world market share is already rather high given its economic size. The correlation 
between trade and distance is shown in panel (b). It relates a simple measure of China’s trade 
intensity – proposed by Frankel (1997) and defined as the “concentration ratio” (see also column 
(j) in Table 1) – to the geographical distance between China and its main trading partners. This 
concentration ratio is measured as the share of country i in Chinese trade relative to the share of 
country i in world trade. The intuitive idea of this ratio is that if bilateral trade takes place in 
geographic patterns that are simply proportional to the distribution of total trade, then the 
concentration ratio should be close to one and the log of the ratio should be close to zero. The 
Chart suggests that there is a close correlation between this measure of trade concentration and 
11
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distance, implying that countries close to China – such as the other Asian emerging economies – 
have stronger trade relationships with China than more distant countries in Europe, for instance. 
A deeper understanding of the actual degree of trade integration of China – given its 
characteristics such as geographical location and economic size – requires, however, a more 
sophisticated empirical approach which takes these and other factors affecting the pattern of 
international trade flows simultaneously into account. The gravity model presented in the next 
section is well suited in this regard. 
 
Chart 1a: Trade and economic size 
In logs 
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3.  Estimating the model 
3.1. Gravity  fundamentals 
Following a specification reminiscent of Newton’s gravitation theory, gravity models relate 
bilateral trade to the mass of these two countries – commonly measured as the economic size of 
the countries involved – and the distance that separates them. This standard formulation of the 
model, which is consistent with standard models of international trade (see among others 
Anderson, 1979, or Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), is commonly extended to include other 
factors generally perceived to affect bilateral trade relationships. Indeed, the notion of distance 
does not only relate to the geographical distance (i.e. transportation costs), but also to other 
factors affecting transaction costs. Four candidate variables are potentially relevant in this 
context. Firstly, we use dummy variables for common language, as countries sharing the same 
language have lower transaction costs to trade and tend to have historically more established 
trade ties (possibly related also to colonial history). Secondly, dummy variables for countries 
sharing a common border enter the specification as the transaction costs argument may also be 
relevant for neighbouring countries as the number of border crossings is smaller.
11 Thirdly, the 
equation includes dummy variables for the countries that were part of the same territory in the 
past (such as the countries of the former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union), as these 
countries are often found to have maintained closer trade ties than otherwise. Finally, we use 
dummy variables for entry and participation in a free trade arrangement (FTA), the aim of such 
agreements being precisely to stimulate trade among the constituent countries. 
Given notable face value evidence that trade flows partly correspond to intra-firm trade, against 
significant reallocation of production in Asia, we considered adding FDI flows as an additional 
regressor.
12 Eventually, however, we decided to drop it due to a number of caveats. First, FDI 
data are very volatile, which considerably complicates estimation. Second, it is not clear per se 
whether FDI impacts trade or if the reverse is true, so that endogeneity issues are particularly 
acute for FDI flows. Theoretically, it is also ambivalent whether FDI is a substitute for or a 
complement to trade, so that the direction of the impact is undetermined (see Markusen and 
Venables, 1998, and Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004). Moreover, FDI inflows may simply imply a 
change in the ownership of an existing firm without having any impact on international trade. 
Third, bilateral FDI data appear to be subject to significant quality constraints. Frequently, data 
on bilateral FDI inflows reported in the recipient country seem to be unrelated to FDI outflows in 
the source country (this is because very often FDI goes through a third country, such that the 
origin and destination of the investment are not correctly reported). Clearly, more research on this 
issue, based on higher quality data, is needed before a better picture can be reached. 
                                                 
11   Crossing a border involves not only fees but also other transaction costs, implying that countries that do not have 
a common border may incur a higher cost of trading with each other, as they have to ship goods through third 
countries. 
12   See for instance Blattner (2005) and the references therein. 
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3.2. Methodological  aspects 
In the literature on gravity models, the emphasis was often placed on the relevance and 
importance of certain policy variables on international trade instead of the intensity of trade per 
se. Among the most prominent examples are the studies by Rose (2000) on the effect of having 
the same currency, McCallum’s (1995) seminal work on the effect of borders or the studies by 
Frankel (1997) and Egger (2004) on the effect of free-trade arrangements. In terms of 
methodology, in many applications country heterogeneity is ignored by using (repeated) cross-
section analyses, pooled OLS specifications or data averaged over longer horizons. However, 
ignoring country heterogeneity can lead to highly distorted estimates. In this context, Mátyás 
(1997, 1998) proposed to include two sets of country dummies (for exporting and importing 
countries). This approach was also employed by Abraham and Van Hove (2005) in a gravity 
model application to Asian countries and China. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) showed, however, 
that instead of having one dummy variable per country, individual country-pair dummies (fixed 
effects) and time dummies to control for common shocks should be used to get efficient 
estimators.
13 Furthermore, Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) suggest that the inclusion of 
country-pair fixed effects may mitigate endogeneity problems. For instance, unusually high trade 
flows may lead to the establishment of a FTA rather than vice versa. Country-pair fixed effects 
take into account whether two countries have traditionally traded a lot.  
If the variables entering the gravity model contain a unit root, cointegration analysis instead of 
standard panel estimation techniques would be more appropriate (Faruqee, 2004). In order to 
account for possible non-stationarity in the data, the results of the fixed-effects estimator are 
compared with the results of the dynamic OLS specification (Kao and Chiang, 2000). Moreover, 
Serlanga and Shin (2004) argue that the fixed-effect estimator ignores the potential correlation 
between the time-invariant variables and unobserved country-pair specific effects which may 
again lead to biased coefficient estimates. In order to address this issue, we cross-check the fixed-
effects results by employing the instrumental variables estimation technique proposed by 
Hausman and Taylor (1981), which allows estimating consistently the coefficients of the time-
invariant variable as well.
14 The results are very similar using these different techniques. In a 
related study using the same dataset as in the present paper, Fidrmuc (2006) further explores the 
issue of the non-stationarity of the variables and of the cross-sectional correlation between the 
panel units (country pairs). He presents alternative estimators but, again, finds very similar 
coefficients to the above mentioned dynamic OLS. 
                                                 
13  Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) included a so-called multilateral trade resistance term in their cross-section 
analysis, which – according to Feenstra, 2002 – may be modelled as country dummies. 
14   The Hausman-Taylor (HT-) estimator is a random-effects estimator which yields consistent and efficient 
estimates even if some explanatory variables are correlated with the error term. Thereby, it also better accounts 
for possible endogeneity between the explanatory variables and trade and allows the estimation of the coefficient 
of the time-invariant variables. In gravity models, the HT-estimator has been used, among others, by Egger 
(2003, 2004), Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003) and Serlenga and Shin (2004).  
14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 693
November 2006 
3.3. Specification   
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where Tijt corresponds to the size of bilateral trade between country i and country j at time t, yijt is 
the sum of yit and yjt, which stand for the (real) GDP in the country i and j, respectively, at time t, 
dij is the distance variable. As standard in the literature, trade is defined as the average of exports 
and imports and distance is measured in terms of great circle distances between the capitals of 
country i and country j.
15 Zk are dummy variables for country-pairs sharing a common language, 
a common border or being members of the same free trade areas.
16 As all trade data are expressed 
in US dollar terms the real exchange rate q of each country against the USD was included to 
control for valuation effects (see Micco, Stein and Ordoñez, 2003 and Graham et al., 2004). 
Consistent with the above arguments, β1 should be positive, β2 negative and all γk are expected to 
have a positive sign. As regards the deterministic terms, αij are the country-pair individual effects 
covering all unobservable factors affecting bilateral trade and θt are the time-specific effects 
accounting for any variables affecting bilateral trade that vary over time, are constant across 
country-pairs such as global changes in transport and communication costs. They also control for 
common shocks or the general trend towards “globalisation”. εij is the error term. 
As the standard fixed-effects estimator precludes estimating the coefficients for dij and Zk (except 
the dummies for the free trade areas) an additional regression of the estimated country-pair 
effects on the time-invariant variables is run for two reasons: Firstly, to understand the 
importance of these variables for international trade, and, secondly, to purge the fixed effects 
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The error term of this last equation has an expected value of zero for the entire sample. For 
individual countries, however, it can be positive or negative, on average. As elaborated in more 
detail in the following section, it can be interpreted as a measure of trade integration, “net of” the 
impact of the other explanatory variables. It therefore represents a more meaningful alternative 
and more refined measure of trade openness than the usual ratios of exports and imports to GDP 
                                                 
15  Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) point out that, in the presence of trade costs, taking the logarithm of the average 
trade flows – as it is common in the literature – can potentially bias the results since the sum of the logarithms of 
exports and imports should be the right measure. We checked both definitions of trade and found that the results 
are not sensitive to the use of one or the other definition. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) also argue against 
deflating nominal trade values by the US aggregate price index. However, as they also mention, the difference 
between the two approaches is mostly offset by including time dummies in the regression, as it is done in this 
study. 
16   As in Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003), real GDP per capita is not included in the fixed effect estimation owing 
to the high collinearity between those dummies and the population.  
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or a country’s world market share as it takes into account the geographical location and the size 
of the country together with various idiosyncratic characteristics.  
 
3.4. Data 
The dataset is equivalent to the one used in a companion paper by Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 
(2005) and includes bilateral trade flows across 61 countries. The countries were selected 
according to the following principles. First, we aimed at including most large trading nations; the 
countries included in the sample cover nearly 90% of world trade. We believe that the 
coefficients are more tightly estimated with more observations, while for drawing policy 
conclusions we wanted to include the world’s key trading partners. Second, we selected countries 
with relatively comparable trade structures in order to be able to pool the observations together. 
This second requirement led us to exclude oil exporting countries, as their trade flows are likely 
to be determined by other factors than for the countries in the sample. This also resulted in 
excluding the least developed countries (LDCs), which often rely on few commodities. Third, we 
had to exclude some countries due to missing data.  
The data are annual and span the period from 1980 to 2003. This amounts to more than 3,500 
bilateral trade relationships and almost 53,000 observations in the standard fixed-effects 
regression.
17 Trade data are from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
(IMF DOTS); they are expressed in US dollars and deflated by US industrial producer prices. 
GDP data come from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS) and are deflated by US 
CPI. The distance term reflects the aerial distance between the capitals of the two countries under 
consideration and comes from the MS Encarta World Atlas software (for details, see data 
appendix). Obviously, this measure has the caveat that it implicitly assumes that (1) overland 
transport costs are comparable to overseas transport costs, and (2) that the capital city is the only 
economic centre of a country which is probably more appropriate for small than for large 
countries. The latter assumption appears to be particularly unsuited for geographically large 
countries with several economic centres such as China and the United States. To account for this, 
the variable was adjusted for those two countries by using a weighted average of the distance of 
each country in the sample to five big cities in China and four big cities in the United States.
18 
The real exchange rate variables are defined as the CPI-based US dollar exchange rates of each 
country. 
The dummy variable for common language was set equal to one if in both countries a significant 
part of the population speaks the same language (English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, 
                                                 
17  Most Central and Eastern European countries enter the dataset in the 1990s only, when the transition period to 
market economies started. 
18  As regards the United States, New York (0.48), Los Angeles (0.23), Chicago (0.17) and Houston (0.12) were 
considered. For China, Shanghai (0.35), Beijing (0.20), Guangzhou (0.19), Chongquing (0.13) and Tianjin (0.13) 
were included. The numbers in parentheses are the respective weights. 
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Swedish, Dutch, Chinese, Malay, Russian, Greek, Arabic, Serbo-Croatian or Albanian). Some 
countries even enter more than one language grouping, such as Canada, where both English and 
French are native languages or Singapore, where English, Chinese and Malay are commonly 
understood languages. Overall, there are 274 country pairs in which the same language is spoken 
(see data Appendix for further details). The dummy variable for having a common border refers 
to 179 land borders shared by the countries included in the sample. We also added one dummy 
variable for German unification. Finally, dummy variables have been included for the most 
important FTAs, namely the European Union, Asean, Nafta, Cefta and Mercosur. The free trade 
areas that have been introduced or have expanded during the analysed period were included 
already in this step, but we also included them in the second step of the regression in order to 
account for the fact that they are associated with higher trade flows between these countries.
19 
3.5. Estimation  results 
The first column shows our central estimation results following the two-step fixed-effects (FE-) 
formulation advocated by Cheng and Wall (2005).
20 In the first step of the regression, economic 
size and most dummies included in order to account for the establishment or expansions of free 
trade areas have the expected sign and are statistically significant. Economic size has a highly 
significant, albeit less-than-proportional, impact on bilateral trade (Table 2). The coefficient of 
roughly 0.5 implies that a 1% increase in GDP in each country is associated with a rise in world 
trade by about 1%. The real exchange rate variables also enter the regression significantly – 
consistent with our concerns about valuation effects. The dummies for free trade arrangements 
enter significantly and with the right sign, with the exception of the EU dummy, which is not 
significant in the first step of this specification.
21  
However, the inclusion of the dummies for free trade arrangements in the second step of the 
regression yields a significant coefficient for the EU dummy. This reflects that most member 
countries of the European Union have joined a common free trade agreement long before the first 
observation in the sample, implying that the effect of EU participation is already accounted for in 
the fixed effects. This is compatible with the argument of the potential endogeneity of the 
creation of FTAs, implying that countries that are well integrated have an incentive to establish a 
free trade arrangement, which – as pointed out by Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) – should be 
captured in the fixed effects. At the same time, the dummies for Mercosur and Cefta have been 
                                                 
19  One may wonder about colinearity among the dummy variables. However, the cross-correlation coefficients 
between all dummy variables (available upon requests) show that the absolute value of these coefficients is 
always small, the highest number being 0.30 for the “language” and the “territory” dummies (e.g. the Czech and 
the Slovak Republics). 
20   The coefficients for the time-invariant variables could be estimated by using a random effect (RE-) model, which 
assumes that explanatory variables are uncorrelated with random effects. However the standard Hausman-test 
strongly suggests that this assumption is violated in the present case. 
21   The marginal effect of the dummy variables can be calculated by taking the exponential of the estimated 
coefficient minus one: a coefficient of 0.5 means that when the dummy is equal to 1, trade increases – ceteris 
paribus — by 65% (e
0.5 - 1= 0.6487) and a coefficient of 0.25 implies a 28% increase. 
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insignificant in this second stage, suggesting that the establishment of these free trade 
arrangements might not reflect strong initial trade relationships, while there might have been an 
effect from the creation of NAFTA. 
The distance term is strongly negative implying that trade between two countries is almost 70% 
higher if the country is half as distant as another otherwise identical market. Similarly, having a 
common border and speaking the same language implies that trade between the two countries is 
three times higher than otherwise, while the common territory dummy is not significant. In order 
to argue on the basis of the most parsimonious model, we excluded the insignificant variables 
from the regression without any notable effect on the other coefficients (see equation (2)). 
Table 2: Estimation Results  
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N  3413 3413 3413 1660    459 
** = Significant at the 1% level,
 * = Significant at the 5% level. 
FE = fixed effects, HT = Hausman-Taylor random effects estimator, DOLS = dynamic OLS. 
The sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness of the estimates: Firstly, accounting for possible 
non-stationarity in and cointegration among the variables, we also employ panel dynamic OLS 
(see equation (3)). This approach also takes better into account the potential endogeneity and 
autocorrelation issues by adding leads and lags of the differenced explanatory variables. The 
DOLS results are very close to the results of the FE-estimator suggesting that the potential bias 
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from the FE-specification should be small. As a second robustness check, two alternative samples 
have been estimated. Equation (4) excludes the transition countries as the inclusion of countries 
may have undesirable effects on the estimates (see Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 2005). With 
the exception of the border and the language dummies – both of which are dropping notably – the 
results are very stable. The distance term is only slightly higher and the dummies included for 
free trade arrangements are relatively close to the estimates shown before. For this sample, the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator shows once more that the specification is very robust to using 
different econometric methods (see equation (5)). Thirdly, as another robustness check, we 
restrained our sample to the OECD countries.
22 Although the number of observations drops by 
roughly 80%, the results are broadly robust (see equation (6)). The variable for economic size and 
distance are still highly significant and the coefficients are rather close to those estimated in the 
full model. The coefficients of the time-invariant variables for having a common border and 




4.  Extracting information from the predicted values 
The results of the gravity model can be interpreted in two different and complementary ways. We 
start with Section 4.1 with the predicted values obtained from the first stage of the fixed-effect 
regression, looking at selected country-pair examples, while section 4.2 delves into the 
interpretation of the second stage results. 
4.1.   Results from the first-stage regression 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we examine the ratio of the actual (i.e. observed) 
divided by predicted trade flows, in percent (see Chart appendix).
24 For instance, the first chart 
(France/Germany) shows that trade flows between the two countries rose in the early 1980s by 
20% above the value predicted by the model, before quickly returning to the region implied by 
our right-hand side variables. A quick glance at most of the other charts for developed countries 
suggests that the model successfully captures the evolution of trade flows over time: the actual 
values are often in the same ballpark as the observed values, and the ratios tend to rapidly 
converge back to 100% when they depart from it.  
Partly, this result depends to a large extent on the fixed effects, which ensure that the residuals 
are equal to zero on average (equivalently, they ensure that the ratios are equal to 100 on average 
for each country pair). However, even controlling for the between information (i.e. the fixed 
                                                 
22   In this specification, several variables used in the full model drop out as there are no relevant observations (e.g. 
Mercosur, Cefta or common territory). 
23   Bootstrapping increases in some cases the standard errors, but the conclusions on the significance of the variables 
at standard levels is unaffected (this was done with 1000 replications). 
24  The predicted values correspond to the projected values of the first stage fixed effect estimation of column 1, 
Table 1. To compute the ratios, both actual and predicted trade values have been “unlogged”. 
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effects), the model satisfactorily explains the within dimension of the panel. The fact that the 
ratio remains around 100% and does not show a clear trend over time also means that the time-
varying right-hand side variables of the regression successfully capture the evolution of bilateral 
trade flows across countries. This is clearly the case for countries pairs like France/Germany, 
Germany/Italy, USA/France, Germany/USA, Germany/UK or France/UK. Among the developed 
economies, the country-pair France/Italy is an important exception: in the late 1980s/early 1990s, 
as well as in the early 2000s, the observed trade flows between these two countries have 
increased by a smaller amount than predicted. A closer look at the data shows that the trade flows 
between France and Italy slowed down in both directions in these two periods. These two periods 
also correspond to two waves of integration of EU countries in Europe. 
The Canada-US country pair provides an interesting example of the sometimes powerful effect of 
FTAs on predicted trade flows: the completion of the 1988 agreement increased the predicted 
value of trade (the denominator), resulting in a fall of the ratio from 120 to 80. This result 
highlights a potential pitfall of capturing the effect of FTAs using coefficients which are 
estimated on the basis of shift dummies across many country pairs: often, the effect of FTAs 
itself is heterogeneous across countries and starts before the official completion of the treaties 
and takes time, sometimes several years, to reach its full impact. In the case of NAFTA, one 
might infer that the effect was larger on the Mexican/USA country pair than on the Canada/USA 
country pair. 
Turning to trade flows between developed countries and China, in most cases, the ratios of actual 
to predicted trade flows remain close to 100%. This suggests that the dynamics of observed trade 
flows with China are successfully captured by our right-hand side variables. In other words, the 
growth of China’s trade flows with most developed countries seems roughly in line with GDP 
growth rates and the other policy variables. This situation contrasts with trade flows between euro 
area countries and other transition economies such as the new EU Member States, for which the 
actual to predicted ratios are strongly upward trending (see for instance trade between Germany 
and the Slovak Republic in the Chart Appendix). Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz (2005) 
suggested that this increase can be interpreted as a convergence towards equilibrium: in the 
beginning of the transition period, the Eastern European countries were trading far below 
potential (i.e. below the value corresponding to the fundamentals), and they later on progressively 
caught up with fundamentals, implying that actual trade rose faster than predicted trade in the 
1990s. 
For China, the ratios tend to be fluctuating around 100 with the developed Asian countries 
(Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore). This highlights that the right-hand side variables are very 
successful in capturing the evolution of trade flows between China and these countries over time. 
By contrast, the ratios are strongly upward trending with the other developed countries in Asia 
(like Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, etc.), with an accelerating pattern in recent years. A 
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possible interpretation of these results can be related to the ongoing relocation of production of 
firms based in other emerging markets in Asia into China. 
Finally, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the model can account for the large 
increase of China’s trade flows in recent years and, thus, captures longer term trends in 
international trade. Over the period 1994-2002, China’s trade rose by nearly 140% (in constant 
dollar terms), while China’s real GDP roughly doubled and the GDP of the rest of the world rose 
by slightly over 40%. Using the coefficients reported in Table 2 together with the time dummies 
reflecting more general globalisation trends, the model predicts that China’s trade flows should 
have risen by a bit more than 150%, which is just slightly higher than the 140% actually recorded 
over this period. This example suggests that over longer periods, the model satisfactorily captures 
the evolution of trade flows. Over short horizons, however, the model’s predictions are less 
accurate. Indeed, in 2003, real GDP increased by around 10% for China and by less than 5% for 
the rest of the world which, together with the information provided by the time dummies, implies 
a rise in China’s trade flows by at most 9%. However, in 2003, China’s trade flows rose by more 
than 30%. On the one hand, this confirms that gravity models are not well suited for forecasting 
trade flows at an annual frequency; on the other hand, it may also suggest that the very strong 
growth rate in Chinese trade recorded after 2003 may be exceptional. The detailed account of the 
results provided in the Chart Appendix suggests that it is especially trade between China and the 
other Asian countries that rose fast in recent years (and in particular in 2003). 
 
4.2  Results from the second stage regression: extracting information from 
country-heterogeneity 
Overall trade intensity of countries 
While Cheng and Wall (2005) call the fixed effects a “result of ignorance” for the estimation, 
they include valuable information for analysing the degree of integration of these countries into 
the world economy. In more detail, the residuals of the second stage regression can be interpreted 
as measures of trade integration after controlling for the relevant fundamentals of the gravity 
equation. As regards the relevant fundamentals, we corrected the residuals for the estimated 
impact of FTAs shown in the second step of the regression for two reasons. Firstly, the high 
absolute value of the coefficients associated with FTAs is likely to mainly reflect a high degree of 
integration of countries establishing a FTA rather than the effect of the FTA itself, which should 
be reflected in a measure of trade integration. Secondly, FTAs are – in contrast to state variables 
such as distance or economic size – the main policy-related variables included in the estimation. 
At the same time, it is important to include these variables into the regression in order to avoid an 
estimation bias owing to omitted variables. Accordingly, the adjusted residuals denoted by 
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For a given country h, a high tih – reflecting strongly positive average residuals of a country – 
signifies that this country has on average strong trade links with the rest of the world, while 
strongly negative average residuals indicate relatively low trade intensity. Chart 1 ranks the 
indicator of trade intensity for all countries in ascending order implying that the indicator of trade 
integration declines from the left to the right (based on equation (2) above). 
Chart 1 provides four key insights. Firstly, the variance of the indicators reveals a considerable 
degree of heterogeneity across countries. Secondly, most industrialised countries – particularly 
the USA, Japan and Germany – tend to display above-average trade integration.
25 Thirdly, the 
South-East Asian countries show a high trade indicator and, thus, little overall trade resistance.
26 
The fact that the Asian countries are found on the left-hand side of the spectrum is relatively 
intuitive as these countries are commonly known to be very open to external trade and have very 
strong trade connections with the rest of the world. In this context, it is noteworthy how well 
China is already integrated into the world economy. China is even among the Asian countries 
more integrated into the global economy than Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, albeit less so 
than Japan and the tiger economies of Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore. Fourthly, at the 
other end of the spectrum are many transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe which are 
by far less integrated into the world, as analysed in detail in Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 
(2005).  
The heterogeneity of trade integration across countries could be an interesting subject for future 
research and we just mention a few possible explanations, with a special focus on China. First, 
the structural composition of trade varies a lot across countries, which is also likely to affect the 
value added implied in trade flows. For countries such as the Netherlands transit trade accounts 
for a substantial part of trade flows and “artificially” increases the value of exports and imports. 
For China, in particular, process trade is estimated to account for around 40% of total exports
27, 
which may partly explain why trade flows are so high with China. Second, foreign direct 
investment is likely to play an important role. It is estimated, for instance, that more than half of 
Chinese exports are produced by foreign funded firms.
28 This is related to the fact that China, 
owing to its low production costs, is increasingly used as an export platform by foreign 
companies, especially by other Asian countries such as Japan. However, Eastern European 
countries also received significant foreign direct investment in recent years, such that further 
                                                 
25   Exceptions are Luxembourg and Greece which appear to face a somewhat higher level of overall trade resistance 
which in the case of Luxembourg may be due to the specific structure of the economy. 
26   This may partly reflect strong intra-regional integration and a relatively low domestic value-added in their 
exports. 
27   Source: CEIC; see http://www.ceicdata.com. 
28   See also CEIC; http://www.ceicdata.com. 
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research would need to have very refined data on FDI in order to derive meaningful conclusions 
on the effect of FDI on trade. Third, although we have included dummy variables for countries 
whose official language is Chinese, the role of the Chinese diaspora (not accounted for by our 
dummy variables) may explain the close trade links between China and some of its partner 
countries. This, again, could partly explain the difference between China and the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Fourth, it might be argued that trade liberalisation in 
China started already in 1978, with key reforms taking place in 1984-85, 1988, 1991 and 1994 
(see Cerra and Chaman Saxena (2002) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006), as well as the 
references therein for a review of these reforms). This could have enhanced China’s trade 
integration much ahead of its 2001 WTO accession; however, it is difficult to assess empirically 
the level of trade liberalization, in particular compared with other transition economies (Brender, 
1992, argues that administrative controls were still important in the 1980s). Finally, regarding the 
countries from the former Yugoslavia, which are at the far right of Chart 1, it seems clear that 
political events in the early 1990s considerably pulled down trade flows and largely explains why 
they have such low trade integration indicators. 
 


































































































































Conditional trade integration with China 
While the results of the previous section show that China is overall already well integrated into 
world markets, the degree of bilateral integration between China and its partners varies 
substantially and contains additional information. Accordingly, it is important to analyse the 
distribution of the average trade integration of China and to condition it on the overall trade 
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integration of each trading partner (this is done in Chart 2). For example, the United States is in 
Chart 1 the country most integrated into world markets (trade integration index amounting to 
about 1.4). At the same time, the United States is even more integrated with China, having a trade 
integration index of about 3.2 (this represents the residual of the second stage regression 
corresponding to the country-pair China/USA). This implies that after controlling for the 
fundamentals of the gravity model the United States trades much more with China than with the 
average trading partner. The integration of the United States with China conditional on the 
overall integration of the United States amounts to about 1.8 (subtracting 1.4 from 3.2). In order 
to illustrate the concept it is also worthwhile to consider the case of Albania which is the least 
globally-integrated country in the sample (ti=-2.3). China’s trade integration with Albania is also 
very limited (ti=-1.4) but given Albania’s low global trade integration standards, these two 
countries are in fact fairly well integrated. This conditional trade integration index with China has 
been computed for each country and ascendingly ordered in Chart 2.  
 
Chart 2: Conditional Trade Indices by Countries, Integration with China as Compared 

















































































































Source:  Authors' calculations
 
Chart 2 suggests that China is very well integrated with Canada, Australia, the United States and 
several Latin American countries (Peru, Uruguay and Argentina). These countries are more 
integrated with China than many emerging economies in Asia and Japan. It is interesting to note 
that Singapore and Hong Kong can only be found towards the right hand side of the spectrum. 
We know of course from Table 1 that Hong Kong is particularly well integrated with China based 
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on standard bilateral openness ratios: around 45% of Hong Kong’s trade is with China. However, 
this high degree of integration is well captured by our right-hand side variables, noticeably the 
fact that Hong Kong and China share a common border and a common language. In fact, when 
looking further into the country sample, other similar examples can be found, where a small 
country trades a lot with a larger neighbouring country sharing the same language (for instance, 
40% of Austria’s trade is with Germany). The correct interpretation to be given to the indicators 
presented in Chart 2 is therefore positive (“the countries on the left trade more than our 
explanatory variables would suggest”) rather than normative (“these countries should trade less 
with China”). Further research might tell what additional factors may account for these 
differences. 
Turning to the euro area countries, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain seem 
to be the countries most closely linked to China in terms of international trade, while 
Luxembourg and Portugal show little trade integration with China. In the case of Luxembourg, 
this is likely to be due to the specific economic structure of the economy. Moreover, consistent 
with Bussière, Fidrmuc and Schnatz (2005), the Central and South Eastern European countries 
are not very well integrated with China. Finally, the location of India in the Chart towards the 
right-hand end of the spectrum is noticeable and confirms the results of Batra (2004). 
Conditional trade integration with China if Asia is the benchmark 
An alternative perspective offers a stronger focus on Asia. It could be argued that for assessing 
the intensity of trade of individual countries with China it is more sensible to compare it with 
their actual trade intensity vis-à-vis other Asian economies instead of their overall trade intensity. 
Recall that in the above example, the overall trade index of the United States was 1.4 while it was 
3.2 for bilateral trade with China. However, the United States is also more tightly integrated with 
the other Asian economies and, thus, the trade intensity with China should also be higher. Taking 
the other Asian countries as a benchmark implies that the gap between Sino-US trade integration 
and Asian-US trade integration is much smaller than the gap between Sino-US trade integration 
and overall US trade integration. Accordingly, Chart 3 ranks the countries with regard to their 
trade integration with China conditional on their trade integration with the other Asian 
economies. 
It suggests that among the industrialised countries, Japan and Canada is well integrated with 
China compared with their integration with other Asian countries. While the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand looked very well integrated with China if compared with their overall 
trade integration, this seemed to reflect that these countries share a particularly strong trade 
relationship with the Asian region. From this perspective, their trade intensity with China does 
not seem to be exceptional. Among the emerging economies, the Latin American countries 
referred to above (Argentina, Peru and Uruguay) and also a number of Central and Eastern 
European countries are well integrated with China if compared to their integration with other 
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Asian countries. Many other OECD countries are also found towards the centre of the Chart, 
where Finland and Spain show a high degree of integration whereas trade between China and the 
United Kingdom Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Luxembourg still seem to be 
less intense. Moreover, trade between India and China is rather low. 
 
Chart 3: Conditional Trade Indices by Countries, Integration with China as compared with 


























































































































This paper analysed the rapid trade integration that took place in the past decade between China 
and the rest of the world. It is argued that the rise in trade flows between China and its trading 
partners should not, per se, come as a surprise, but rather reflects China’s shift towards more 
market-oriented policies together with robust economic growth.  
We use a gravity model, which captures well the evolution of trade flows over time and across 
countries, to develop and quantify a new benchmark for trade intensity. This approach helps to 
identify whether for instance, small open economies, which are commonly found to have a high 
trade to GDP ratio, are indeed well integrated into the world economy. We shed light on the 
overall degree of trade intensity of a large number of countries as well as the depth of bilateral 
trade linkages with major economies. 
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The comparison of actual and predicted trade flows shows that for most country-pairs, the model 
successfully captures the evolution of bilateral trade over time. Overall, the rapid integration of 
China in world markets is well reflected by the fundamentals in the case of many developed 
countries in Western Europe and North America. These results tend to put in perspective the 
strong growth in bilateral trade flows between China and its partner countries.
29 
Moreover, our new measure of trade intensity suggests that China is overall already very well 
integrated in world markets. Comparing the trade intensity of China across countries and using 
the overall trade intensity of these countries is taken as a benchmark suggests that China is well 
integrated with the United States, Canada, Australia and several Latin American countries. 
Among the euro area countries, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain seem to 
be the country most closely linked to China in terms of international trade, while Luxembourg 
and Portugal show little trade integration with China. Using instead the partner countries’ trade 
intensity vis-à-vis other Asian countries as a benchmark confirms, on the one hand, the close ties 
between China and Canada as well as the Latin American countries and the low trade intensity 
between India and China. Notably, however, for the United States and Australia the trade ties 
with China do not seem to be extraordinarily high if compared with their trade intensity with 
other countries in the Asian region. 
 
                                                 
29  However, it does not mean of course that the trade integration of China is neutral to the welfare of the other 
countries. For instance, one key issue, not tackled in this paper, is the fact that China’s trade integration is not 
even across sectors (see e.g. Rodrik (2006)), which may imply a necessary reallocation of resources across 
sectors. Holzmann, Thimann and Pelz (1993) provided an early analysis of the impact on OECD economies of 
the trade integration of transition countries and of the possible policy reforms. See Mandelson (2006) for a recent 
policy discussion.  
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Countries included: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, USA. 
Trade data: IMF DOTS. 
GDP: IFS line 99b. For Ecuador data from WDI. Data for Greece up to 1994 from WDI. Date for Turkey 
up to 1985 from WDI. If there was a large discrepancy between World Bank and IMF data, observations 
have been dropped. This includes Argentina (1980-84), Bulgaria (1985-92), China (1980-1993), Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania (each 1993-95), Moldova (1995), Russia (1993-94), Ukraine (1993-95), for Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Macedonia data from EBRD. 
Distance: Great circle distances based on MS Encarta World Atlas software.  
Exchange rate: IFS line rf. Exchange rates for individual euro area countries were chain-lined with the 
euro exchange rate upon EMU entry. 
Consumer prices: IFS line 64. For Belarus, China, Russia and the Ukraine, inflation rates (IFS line 
64.xx) were transformed into price indices. 
Industrial producer price: IFS line 63a for the United States. 
Real exchange rate: Product of the US dollar exchange rate and the ratio of domestic and foreign 
consumer prices. 
Exchange rate volatility: Standard deviation of the month-on-month log changes in the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate within a year. 
Common border: A matrix is available upon request. 
Common language: Based on a matrix including the following languages: English (Australia, Canada, 
India, Ireland, Hong Kong, Malta, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, United Kingdom and the USA), 
Spanish (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela), French 
(Algeria, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Morocco, Switzerland), German (Austria, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland), Chinese (China, Hong Kong, Singapore), Russian (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), Dutch (Belgium, Netherlands), Greek (Greece, Cyprus), Arabic 
(Algeria, Morocco), Serbo-Croatian (Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia), Portuguese (Brazil, Portugal), Swedish 
(Sweden, Finland), Albanian (Albania, Macedonia), Malay (Malaysia, Singapore). 
Free-trade agreement:  ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations (1967): Brunei (1984), 
Cambodia (1999), Indonesia, Laos (1997), Malaysia, Myanmar (1997), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam (1995), CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement (1994): Bulgaria (1999), Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (1997), European Union 
(EU15):Austria (1995), Belgium, Denmark, Finland (1995), France, Germany, Greece (1981), Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal (1986), Spain (1986), Sweden (1995), United Kingdom, 
European Union (EU15) and Customs Unions: EU15, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey (1996); MERCOSUR 
Southern Common Market (1993): Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay, NAFTA North American Free 
Trade Agreement: Canada (1988), Mexico (1993), United States (1988). 
Common territory includes countries which constituted in the past 20 years at some point a common 
country. They include a) former Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic), b) 
countries of the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and the 
Ukraine, and c) countries of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia). 
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CHART APPENDIX 
Acronyms: Rest of Asia (ROA), New EU Member States (NMS); see country list in Table 3. 
Chart A1: Extra-euro area trade shares. 


































Chart A2: Trade shares, Germany. 












































Chart A3: Trade shares, France. 















































Chart A4: Trade shares, Italy. 










































Chart A5: Trade shares, USA. 































Chart A6: Trade shares, UK. 
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Chart A7: Trade shares, Spain. 




































Chart A8: Trade shares, China. 













































Chart A9: Trade shares, Japan. 

































Chart A10: Trade shares, ROA. 












































Chart A11: Trade shares, Korea. 
































Chart A12: Trade shares, Thailand. 












































Acronyms: Rest of Asia (ROA), New EU Member States (NMS); see country list in Table 3. 
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TABLE APPENDIX 
Table 3: Selected Variables for the Countries Included in the Sample 
1995 2005 p.c 1995 2005 p.c 1995 2005 p.c 1995 2005 p.c
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M)
China 3.7 7.7 4.0 32.7 62.4 29.7 ND ND ND ND ND ND
Euro Area
Austria 1.1 1.1 0.0 50.9 75.5 24.6 1.0 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.2 -0.1
Belgium 2.8 2.7 -0.1 112.0 136.5 24.5 0.7 2.1 1.4 0.8 0.8 0.0
Finland 0.7 0.6 0.0 52.4 62.6 10.2 1.4 3.6 2.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
France 5.3 4.5 -0.8 33.7 43.5 9.8 1.4 2.7 1.3 1.6 1.5 -0.1
Germany 9.2 8.2 -1.0 39.3 63.9 24.6 1.9 4.3 2.4 4.9 4.4 -0.4
Greece 0.3 0.3 0.0 33.1 31.3 -1.8 1.0 3.1 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ireland 0.7 1.0 0.3 114.5 86.1 -28.5 0.5 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.3 0.3
Italy 3.9 3.5 -0.5 39.1 41.8 2.7 1.5 3.1 1.6 1.8 1.3 -0.5
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.0 104.2 95.2 -9.0 0.4 7.3 6.9 0.0 0.2 0.1
Netherlands 3.5 3.4 -0.2 88.5 102.2 13.7 0.9 4.6 3.7 1.4 2.0 0.6
Portugal 0.5 0.5 -0.1 50.4 53.0 2.6 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0
Spain 1.9 2.2 0.3 34.3 41.9 7.6 1.6 3.0 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.1
Total 
2/ 31.3 28.7 -2.6 44.8 58.2 13.4 1.6 3.8 2.2 12.0 12.1 0.1
  extra-trade only
2/ 18.0 17.0 -1.0 21.7 29.7 8.0 3.0 6.6 3.6 ND ND ND
Other developed countries
Australia 1.1 1.1 0.0 29.8 32.0 2.2 4.7 12.7 8.0 1.5 1.9 0.4
Canada 3.5 3.2 -0.4 61.1 61.4 0.3 1.6 4.6 3.0 1.5 1.3 -0.2
Denmark 0.8 0.7 -0.1 53.0 61.6 8.7 1.1 2.9 1.7 0.2 0.3 0.1
Japan 7.6 5.3 -2.2 13.8 22.8 9.0 7.4 17.0 9.6 20.4 13.0 -7.5
New Zealand 0.3 0.2 0.0 43.1 43.0 -0.1 3.0 5.7 2.7 0.2 0.2 0.0
Norway 0.7 0.8 0.0 51.6 54.2 2.6 1.1 2.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.0
Sweden 1.3 1.2 -0.2 57.9 67.9 10.1 1.1 2.7 1.6 0.5 0.4 -0.1
Switzerland 1.8 1.4 -0.4 52.1 69.6 17.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.4 -0.1
UK 4.8 4.1 -0.8 44.4 40.2 -4.2 0.9 3.4 2.5 1.7 1.7 0.0
USA 13.6 12.1 -1.5 17.9 20.6 2.7 4.4 11.4 7.0 14.5 14.9 0.4
Other Emerging East Asian Countries
Hong Kong 2.2 1.8 -0.4 254.1 330.1 76.0 34.8 45.0 10.2 15.9 9.6 -6.3
Indonesia 0.8 0.8 -0.1 40.4 54.5 14.1 3.8 10.3 6.6 1.2 1.2 -0.1
Malaysia 1.6 1.4 -0.2 161.3 190.5 29.2 2.4 10.4 8.1 1.2 2.2 1.0
Philippines 0.5 0.5 0.1 58.0 87.7 29.7 1.9 14.3 12.4 0.5 1.2 0.8
Singapore 2.0 1.8 -0.2 303.4 365.6 62.3 2.8 10.1 7.3 2.5 2.3 -0.1
South Korea 2.3 2.6 0.2 49.2 68.7 19.5 6.2 19.5 13.3 6.0 7.9 1.8
Thailand 1.2 1.1 -0.1 75.1 134.5 59.5 2.8 8.9 6.1 1.2 1.5 0.3
Total 
2/ 12.8 11.3 -1.5 98.4 129.1 30.7 12.5 21.1 8.6 28.8 26.5 -2.3
  extra-trade only
2/
10.4 9.0 -1.5 78.1 100.4 22.2 15.7 27.1 11.4 ND ND ND
Trade               
(% of world trade)
Share of country in 
column A in trade of 
China
Share of China in 
trade of country in 
column A
Trade openness 
1/        
(% GDP)
Multilateral openess Bilateral openess with China
 
Source: IMF DOTS, WEO, IFS. 
Notes: For regional aggregates, the “total” value refers to two measures, including intra-regional trade 
and excluding it. In the case of column H, I and J, the share of China is always higher for extra-regional 
trade than for total trade, as the denominator is smaller. For column B, C and D the denominator differs 
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Table 3: Continued. 
1995 2005 p.c 1995 2005 p.c 1995 2005 p.c 1995 2005 p.c
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M)
New EU Member States
Cyprus 0.1 0.1 0.0 49.5 42.5 -7.1 1.4 3.3 1.8 0.02 0.02 0.00
Czech Republic 0.4 0.7 0.3 82.7 129.6 46.9 0.8 2.8 2.1 0.08 0.14 0.06
Estonia 0.0 0.1 0.0 107.9 133.7 25.8 0.3 2.4 2.1 0.00 0.03 0.02
Hungary 0.3 0.6 0.3 68.4 117.4 49.0 0.5 4.0 3.5 0.13 0.20 0.07
Latvia 0.1 0.1 0.0 67.8 82.2 14.4 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.01 0.02 0.01
Lithuania 0.1 0.1 0.1 85.7 96.0 10.3 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.00 0.03 0.03
Malta 0.1 0.0 0.0 145.1 112.7 -32.4 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.01 0.04 0.03
Poland 0.5 0.8 0.3 37.2 64.4 27.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.20 0.22 0.02
Slovak Rep. 0.2 0.3 0.1 89.7 141.6 51.9 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.02 0.03 0.01
Slovenia 0.2 0.2 0.0 58.0 87.7 29.7 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.01 0.02 0.01
Total 
2/ 1.8 3.1 1.3 58.5 93.1 34.5 0.7 2.4 1.7 0.47 0.75 0.28
  extra-trade only
2/ 1.5 2.6 1.1 50.7 79.6 28.9 0.8 2.8 2.0 ND ND ND
Latin America
Argentina 0.4 0.3 -0.1 15.5 37.3 21.8 2.2 7.2 5.0 0.23 0.36 0.13
Brazil 1.0 1.0 0.0 13.7 24.2 10.5 2.3 7.0 4.7 0.71 1.04 0.33
Chile 0.3 0.3 0.0 43.0 61.1 18.1 2.1 9.6 7.5 0.23 0.50 0.27
Colombia 0.2 0.2 0.0 25.7 34.2 8.6 0.3 2.9 2.6 0.02 0.08 0.06
Ecuador 0.1 0.1 0.0 41.9 59.9 17.9 0.1 2.5 2.5 0.03 0.04 0.01
Mexico 1.4 1.9 0.5 34.8 37.1 2.3 0.4 1.9 1.6 0.14 0.55 0.41
Peru 0.1 0.1 0.0 24.7 37.3 12.6 3.9 9.8 5.9 0.22 0.20 -0.01
Uruguay 0.1 0.0 0.0 25.2 45.8 20.7 3.2 5.2 2.0 0.05 0.03 -0.02
Total 
2/ 4.0 4.5 0.4 21.1 33.8 12.7 1.4 4.8 3.4 1.69 2.95 1.26
  extra-trade only
2/ 3.5 3.9 0.4 17.9 29.1 11.3 1.6 5.6 3.9 ND ND ND
Other developing/emerging countries
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.6 38.4 5.8 0.4 3.1 2.7 0.01 0.01 0.00
Belarus 0.1 0.1 0.0 97.5 108.0 10.4 0.3 2.1 1.7 0.01 0.04 0.03
Bosnia 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.2 88.8 12.5 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.00 0.01 0.01
Bulgaria 0.1 0.1 0.0 75.5 108.5 33.0 0.4 2.0 1.6 0.02 0.04 0.02
Croatia 0.1 0.1 0.0 65.2 73.0 7.8 0.6 3.2 2.6 0.01 0.04 0.04
India 0.7 1.0 0.3 20.5 31.5 11.0 1.7 7.8 6.1 0.41 1.32 0.90
Macedonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.1 102.7 43.7 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.0 107.5 112.5 5.0 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.00 0.00 0.00
Morocco 0.2 0.2 0.0 49.2 55.8 6.6 1.4 4.1 2.6 0.05 0.10 0.05
Romania 0.2 0.3 0.1 49.0 66.3 17.3 1.5 2.5 1.1 0.12 0.12 -0.01
Russia 1.3 1.8 0.5 46.3 48.3 2.1 3.4 6.0 2.6 1.95 2.05 0.10
Turkey 0.5 0.9 0.3 36.9 51.4 14.5 1.1 3.0 2.0 0.20 0.34 0.14
Ukraine 0.3 0.4 0.1 84.2 86.7 2.5 1.6 4.5 2.8 0.22 0.23 0.01
Trade openness 
1/        
(% GDP)
Trade               
(% of world trade)
Share of China in 
trade of country in 
column A
Share of country in 
column A in trade of 
China
Multilateral openess Bilateral openess with China
 
Source: IMF DOTS, WEO, IFS. 
Notes: For regional aggregates, the “total” value refers to two measures, including intra-regional trade 
and excluding it. In the case of column H, I and J, the share of China is always higher for extra-regional 
trade than for total trade, as the denominator is smaller. For column B, C and D the denominator differs 
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